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Bob D. Harrison* and Terry R. Abel**
HIS Article reviews cases decided between October 15, 1985, and Oc-
tober 15, 1986, on the topics of wills, life estates, nontestamentary
transfers, estate administration, guardianships, and trusts.
I. WILLS
Execution of a Will. Hopkins v. HopkinsI reaffirms the rule announced by
the Texas Supreme Court in Boren v. Boren 2 that a will is invalid if the
signatures of the attesting witnesses appear only on the self-proving affidavit
but not on the will itself. The proponents of the will attempted to distin-
guish a sequel to the Boren case, Wich v. Fleming,3 in which the Texas
Supreme Court refused to assume that the witnesses had not read the self-
proving affidavit and were therefore unaware of its significance. The propo-
nents in Hopkins offered affidavits of the witnesses confirming that they had
not read the self-proving affidavit and that they intended to attest to the will.
The proponents also argued that, because the witnesses were not under oath,
the affidavit was invalid, and its language was therefore surplusage. Af-
firming the probate court's summary judgment denying probate, the Hopkins
court refused to accept that Wich in any way qualified the Boren decision.4
The court reiterated that the will and self-proving affidavit are separate doc-
uments, since the signatures on one are insufficient to validate the other. 5
Further, the court refused to consider extrinsic evidence concerning whether
the witnesses had read the self-proving affidavit and, consistent with the
Texas Supreme Court ruling in Orrell v. Cochran,6 reaffirmed the rule that
proof of an improperly executed self-proving affidavit would not convert the
signatures on the affidavit into proper attestations to the will.7 The contes-
tants in Hopkins later joined the proponents and requested the appellate
court to reverse and render a decision consistent with an agreement by all
* B.B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Johnson & Swanson,
Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., Cornell University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law,
Johnson & Swanson, Dallas, Texas.
1. 708 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. 402 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Tex. 1966).
3. 652 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. 1983).
4. 708 S.W.2d at 33.
5. Id.
6. 695 S.W.2d 552, 552 (Tex. 1985).
7. 708 S.W.2d at 33.
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parties consenting to the admission of the will to probate. The court stated
that although rule 387(a)(1) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure8 author-
ized the court to recognize agreements made by the parties, the court could
not do so if the result would be to admit an invalid will to probate.9
Lost Will. The proponent of a lost will in Hoppe v. Hoppe 10 overcame the
presumption of revocation that arises when a validly executed will is last
seen in the decedent's possession or in a place where the decedent had ready
access to it, and cannot be found after the decedent's death. 1I As a general
rule, a proponent may not admit a will to probate unless he proves to the
court's satisfaction that the decedent did not revoke the will. 12 In Hoppe the
testatrix had executed her will in 1971, in her attorney's presence, leaving
her entire estate to the proponent. The testatrix died in 1979, and in 1983
the proponent sought to admit the will to probate. Although no one could
find the will, the proponent alleged that it was last seen in the possession of
the testatrix's attorney, and that someone in the attorney's office lost or de-
stroyed it. The contestants claimed that the estate should pass by intestacy
because the proponent had failed to prove that the will was valid and not
revoked. The trial court refused to probate the will, relying on a jury finding
that the will was last seen in Mrs. Hoppe's possession or in a place where she
had ready access to it and disregarding a jury finding that the testatrix had
not revoked the will. The proponent argued that as a matter of law the will
was in the attorney's possession when it was last seen.
The court considered the concepts of possession or ready access in the
context of a testator who places his will in an attorney's vault for safekeeping
with freedom to obtain the will at any time. 13 In this situation the testator
does not have a key to the vault or free access to the office at any time,
factors indicating that he did not have possession or ready access to the will,
but factors that are not in themselves conclusive. The court noted that the
testatrix visited the law office many times during the eight years between the
8. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 387a(a)(1) (Vernon 1985) (repealed 1986) recodified in TEX. RUL.
APP. P. 59a(l)(A) (1986).
9. 708 S.W.2d at 32. Contrast this decision with a family settlement agreement not to
probate a validly executed will. See Salmon v. Salmon, 395 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1965); Cook v.
Hamer, 158 Tex. 164, 167, 309 S.W.2d 54, 56 (1958). An agreement to that effect must in-
clude an agreement for the distribution of the estate. See Estate of Morris, 577 S.W.2d 748,
756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). If all parties agree to distribute the
estate consistently with the terms of an invalid will, the estate passes pursuant to the agree-
ment, rather than under the will. 708 S.W.2d at 32.
10. 703 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. This presumption does not arise if the decedent was not the last person seen with the
will. Aschenbeck v. Aschenbeck, 62 S.W.2d 326, 327 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1933, writ
dism'd w.o.j.).
12. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 88(b)(3) (Vernon 1980).
13. 703 S.W.2d at 227. The court relied on Thompson v. Dobbs, 234 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the court held that a will the dece-
dent delivered to the scrivener for safekeeping was not in the decedent's possession at death.
Id. at 941. The Hoppe court noted, however, that in Thompson less than two years had elapsed
from the time the decedent signed the will until the decedent's death and that no evidence
indicated that the decedent had seen the scrivener during that time. 703 S.W.2d at 227.
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execution of her will and her death. 14 The court refused to impose a narrow
definition of possession or ready access, citing authority in which the court
found that a testator retained sufficient possession or access to invoke the
presumption of revocation when he placed his will in a safe deposit box and
the will was not found at his death. 15 The appellate court in Hoppe upheld
the trial court's acceptance of the jury finding that the testatrix had posses-
sion of or access to her will, but disagreed with the trial court's rejection of
the jury finding that she had not revoked her will. 16 The court stressed that
the proponent may rebut the presumption of revocation by clear and con-
vincing evidence,17 and further determined that sufficient evidence existed to
support the jury finding of nonrevocation. 18
The court in Coulson v. Sheppard 19 denied probate of a lost will 20 because
the proponent failed to prove the statutory requirement that the decedent
duly executed the will.2 I The proponent met the additional statutory re-
quirements of providing the cause of nonproduction, satisfying the court
that the will could not be produced by any reasonable diligence, and present-
ing a credible witness who had read the will or heard it read to prove the
contents of the will.22 The proponent offered written depositions of a wit-
ness to the will and the attorney who prepared the will in order to fulfill the
final proof of execution requirement. The court refused to admit this evi-
dence, however, because the proponent did not follow the detailed proce-
dures for written depositions under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.23
The court then disagreed with the proponent's contention that the execution
of a codicil republished the will, thereby eliminating the need to prove due
14. 703 S.W.2d at 227.
15. Id.; see also Carter v. Massey, 668 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ)
(life insurance policy in employer's possession in insured's control); Davis v. Roach, 138
S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (testator only had to
ask for his box).
16. 703 S.W.2d at 228-29.
17. Id. at 228. The clear and convincing evidence may not be contradictory, ambiguous,
or equivocal, and must be sufficient to convince an unbiased and unprejudiced mind. Berry v.
Griffin, 531 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
18. 703 S.W.2d at 229.
19. 700 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
20. Id. at 338.
21. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 84 (Vernon 1980).
22. Id. § 85; see also Howard Hughes Medical Inst. v. Neff, 640 S.W.2d 942, 951 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (§ 85 controls proof requirements); In re
Estate of Simms, 442 S.W.2d 426, 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(provides mandatory § 85 requirements).
23. 700 S.W.2d at 337. Rule 208 provides that a party intending to take a deposition
upon questions must serve all parties with written notice 10 days before he takes the deposi-
tion. TEX. R. Civ. P. 208(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987). The notice must provide information
about the lawsuit, the deponent, the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken, and
whether the deposing party will request production of documents or items. Id. Any party
must have the opportunity to serve cross questions. Id. 208(3). The officer must be a person
who is authorized to administer oaths and who will administer the oath, take the testimony of
the deponent, file the deposition, and notify all parties that he has filed the deposition. Id.
208(4). The deposing party must then make the deposition available for inspection by the
deponent or any party. Id. 208(5).
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execution.24 Finally, under the no evidence standard of review, the court
held that no evidence of due execution existed.25
The decedent's estate in Gifford v. Bank of the Southwest 26 passed by in-
testacy when the bank with which the decedent placed his will was unable to
locate the will. Apparently, no one attempted to probate the will as a lost
will. Further, no one attempted to sue the bank until the bank located the
will, a date well after the statute of limitations had run.27
Will Contest. In Mircovich v. Mircovich 28 the only one of nine siblings ex-
cluded from his mother's will filed a will contest, alleging that his mother
lacked testamentary capacity and executed her will under undue influence.
The trial court rendered a judgment admitting the will to probate notwith-
standing the jury verdict that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity. 29
The appellant argued that his mother attempted, due to an insane delusion
or lack of mental capacity, to bequeath to him two shrimp boats he already
owned and therefore excluded him as a residuary beneficiary. His brothers'
testimony supported these contentions. The appellate court consequently
held that the contestant presented sufficient direct evidence to support the
jury's verdict and reinstated the jury's finding that the testatrix lacked testa-
mentary capacity.30 Accordingly, the appellate court invalidated the will,
requiring that the court set aside letters testamentary that had been issued
24. 700 S.W.2d at 338. The proponent did not introduce the codicil into evidence. Id.
25. Id. The witness was able to testify that the will was signed, but could not recall if the
self-proving affidavit had been signed as required under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon
1980). 700 S.W.2d at 338. In the absence of a self-proving affidavit, the proponent must prove
that the will was properly executed. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 88(b)(2) (Vernon 1980). Id.
§ 59 provides:
Every last will and testament, except where otherwise provided by law, shall
be in writing and signed by the testator in person or by another person for him
by his direction and in his presence, and shall, if not wholly in the handwriting
of the testator, be attested by two (2) or more credible witnesses above the age of
fourteen (14) years who shall subscribe their names thereto in their own hand-
writing in the presence of the testator.
26. 712 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
27. The applicable statute of limitations was four years from the date that the cause of
action accrued. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1985) (now
codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986)). The court held
that the widow's cause of action accrued in 1974, when the estate passed by intestacy, rather
than in 1982, when the widow learned that the bank had found her late husband's will. 712
S.W.2d at 184.
28. 703 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
29. Id. at 325.
30. Id. at 327. The instruction to the jury included the previously approved definition of
mental ability to make a will. Id. at 325. In the jury instruction testamentary capacity meant:
[T]he person at the time of the execution of the will has sufficient mental ability
to understand the business in which he is engaged, and the effect of his act in
making the will, and the general nature and extent of his property. He must also
be able to know his next of kin and the natural objects of his bounty and their
claims upon him. He must have memory sufficient to collect in his mind the
elements of the business to be transacted and to hold them long enough to per-
ceive, at least their obvious relation to each other, and to be able to form a
reasonable judgment as to them.
Reynolds v. Park, 485 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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previously under the authority of the will.31
A contestant also offered undue influence and lack of testamentary capac-
ity as grounds to invalidate a will in Hirdler v. Boyd.32 The testatrix in that
case executed her will in the presence of her sister, who allegedly influenced
the decedent to make an unnatural disposition of her estate. In its instruc-
tion to the jury, the trial court stated that "[a] person of sound mind has the
legal right to dispose of his property as he wishes; and, it is immaterial that
the jury mayfeel the disposition of the property should have been different.' '33
The court admitted the will to probate, and on appeal the contestants as-
serted that the italicized constituted an improper comment on the weight of
the evidence. 34 The contestants claimed that this language precluded the
jury from considering whether the decedent had made an unnatural disposi-
tion of property, an important element in their proof of undue influence.
The court noted, however, that an unnatural disposition of property, by it-
self, is insufficient to establish undue influence, which the contestant must
prove to have been present and exercised at the time the testatrix executed
her will. 35 Considering the charge as a whole, the court concluded that the
jury received neither a misleading nor an improper instruction. 36
Executor's fees were at issue in Schulte v. Marik,37 in which the individual
named as alternate or successor independent executor sought to recover at-
torney's fees from an estate following a will contest. The successor failed in
his attempt to disqualify the proponent from being named independent des-
ignated executrix. Section 243 of the Texas Probate Code provides that the
designated executor is entitled to have necessary expenses, including reason-
able attorney's fees, paid from the estate if he has defended or prosecuted
any proceeding related to that will in good faith, whether or not he was
successful. 38 Applying a literal reading to the statute, the court had little
difficulty disallowing the payment of the attorney's fees to anyone but the
designated executrix, and concluded that the statute does not contemplate
31. 703 S.W.2d at 327; see Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh, 249 S.W. 264, 265 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1923, no writ); accord In re Fowler's Estate, 87 S.W.2d 896, 897 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1935, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
32. 702 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. Id. at 729 (emphasis by the court).
34. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
35. 702 S.W.2d at 730. In order to prove undue influence, a party must establish: (1) that
the undue influence existed and was exerted; (2) that the influence was exerted so as to subvert
or overpower the testator's mind at the time he or she executed her will; and (3) the execution
of a will that expresses the intentions of the individual exerting the influence, rather than the
intention of the testator. Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963). In Novak v.
Schellenberg, 718 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ), the court clari-
fied that undue influence is also a species of fraud. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying
text.
36. 702 S.W.2d at 730. The court further explained that even if the instruction was an
improper comment on the weight of the evidence, the instruction was harmless in view of the
entire charge to the jury. Id. Justice Esquivel dissented. In his view the contestants were
prejudiced because the instruction had the practical effect of telling the jury to disregard evi-
dence of the testatrix's unnatural disposition of her property. Id. at 731-32.
37. 700 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 243 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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payment of attorney's fees to a named alternate or successor executor. 39
Estate of Ayala 40 involved inheritance rights of pretermitted children. In
1953 the decedent executed a will in the United States designating his two
sons as the sole beneficiaries of his property in this country. The decedent
executed a new will in 1971 in Mexico, leaving all the property he possessed
at his death to those same two sons, subject to specific bequests to his wife
and four other children. The contestants hereunder, who were two of the
other four children, were born after the decedent executed the 1953 will but
before he executed the 1971 will. After the probate of each will in its respec-
tive country, the contestants filed a will contest in Texas alleging that they
were pretermitted children under the Texas Probate Code. Texas Probate
Code section 67(a) provides that if a testator has a child or children at the
time he executes his last will and testament, and subsequently has additional
children, the after-born children shall be entitled to their intestate share of
their parent's estate, unless they were "provided for by settlement."' 4' The
court initially explained that the Texas statute is intended to guard against
the accidental or inadvertent omission of a child from a parent's testamen-
tary plan, rather than to limit a testator's power to control the disposition of
his estate.42 Noting that the statute is inapplicable for children "provided
for by settlement," the court then turned to New York law in the absence of
Texas cases construing that clause.43 The court concluded that it must ex-
amine the facts of each case and, more importantly, the intent of the testator
in order to determine if the testator made a settlement.44 The court defined
"settlement" broadly and held that any future provision evincing intent to
make alternate arrangements for a particular child will suffice.45 Consistent
with this interpretation, the court considered the adequacy and equality of
the settlement among the testator's children immaterial. 46 The court con-
cluded that, having made specific bequests to his afterborn children under
39. 700 S.W.2d at 687. Courts have awarded attorney's fees to persons named as the
executors of estates. See, e.g., Wich v. Fleming, 652 S.W.2d 353, 355-56 (Tex. 1983); Miller v.
Anderson, 651 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Tex. 1983); Russell v. Moelling, 526 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex.
1975).
40. 702 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
41. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 67(a) (Vernon 1980). In addition, § 67(a) does not apply if
the surviving spouse is the parent of all of the decedent's children and is the principal benefici-
ary under the decedent's will. Section 67(b) of the Probate Code addresses the situation in
which the testator had no children at the time he executed his will, but dies leaving children
who are not provided for or mentioned in the will. Id. § 67(b).
42. 702 S.W.2d at 711; see McQueen v. Stephens, 100 S.W.2d 1053, 1056 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1937, no writ); see also Pearce v. Pearce, 104 Tex. 73, 81, 134 S.W. 210, 214
(1911) (failure to include child must be accidental).
43. 702 S.W.2d at 711.
44. Id.
45. Id. For example of settlements in New York cases, see, e.g., In re Faber's Estate, 305
N.Y. 200, 111 N.E.2d 883, 887 (1953) (child designated as beneficiary of life insurance policy);
In re Crawford's Estate, 64 Misc. 2d 758, 315 N.Y.S.2d 890, 894 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1970) (trust
for child); In re Georger's Will, 48 Misc. 2d 579, 265 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1965)
(savings account in child's name); In re Fredenthal's Estate, 25 Misc. 2d 1068, 206 N.Y.S.2d
194, 197 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1960) (child designated as beneficiary of life insurance policy); In re
Staub's Will, 17 Misc. 2d 215, 184 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1959) (savings account).
46. 702 S.W.2d at 711.
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the 1971 will, the testator had provided for them by settlement, rendering
the Texas statute inapplicable. 47
The will contest in Jones v. Jones48 involved the issue of whether a joint
will was mutual and contractual as a matter of law. The trial court admitted
a subsequent will executed by the survivor to probate, but imposed a con-
structive trust on the survivor's estate in favor of the beneficiaries under the
joint will. The appellate court affirmed the trial court and concluded that
the following key elements in finding a joint and contractual will were pres-
ent: the will provided a comprehensive plan for the disposition of both es-
tates, and the gift to the survivor was not absolute, but was conditioned by
the agreement ultimately to leave the combined estate to designated benefi-
ciaries.49 The court agreed that the survivor consequently was unable to
alter the terms of the contractual will after her husband's death.50
Will Construction. The Texas Supreme Court granted a motion for rehear-
ing and reversed its decision in Kelley v. Marlin,5 1 over the dissents of four
justices. Kelley involved a declaratory judgment in which the court con-
strued a will provision that designated Marlin the exclusive real estate agent.
The will further entitled Marlin to receive a six percent commission upon
the widow's sale of any real estate devised to her under her husband's will,
and provided that the agent could collect the commission from the sale pro-
ceeds. The estate's executor sold real property devised to the widow for ten
million dollars and paid a commission to the widow's son from a former
marriage instead of to Marlin. Marlin failed in his attempt to recover the
commission in the trial court, but the appellate court held that he was enti-
tled to the commission as a conditional beneficiary. 52 The Texas Supreme
Court initially concurred with the trial court, but, on rehearing, withdrew its
opinion and addressed the issue of whether Marlin was a conditional benefi-
ciary under the will. 53 Holding that Marlin was indeed a conditional benefi-
ciary, the court emphasized the mandatory language employed in the will,
which, in effect, created an equitable charge on the real estate devised to the
widow. 54 The court did not accept the executor's technical argument that
the executor made the sale, not the widow. 55 The court reasoned that, under
the Texas Probate Code, title to the property vested immediately in the
widow, subject to the payment of estate debts and to the equitable charge
created by the recognition of Marlin as a conditional beneficiary. 56
47. Id.
48. 718 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
49. Id. at 418; see Fisher v. Capp, 597 S.W.2d 393, 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. 718 S.W.2d at 418.
51. 714 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1986).
52. Marlin v. Kelley, 678 S.W.2d 582, 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984).
53. 714 S.W.2d at 304.
54. Id. at 305.
55. Id. at 305-06.
56. Id.; see also White v. White, 142 Tex. 499, 503, 179 S.W.2d 503, 505 (1944) (title vests
immediately upon death); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (Vernon Supp. 1987) (powers of ap-
pointment vest immediately upon death).
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In a well-reasoned dissenting opinion, Justice Wallace, joined by Justices
Campbell, Spears, and Ray, pointed out that a commission is not equivalent
to a gift and that, in this case, Marlin had not earned a commission by acting
as the real estate agent in the sales transaction. 57 Justice Wallace analogized
the testator's designation of Marlin as his exclusive real estate agent to a case
in which the court held that the testator's appointment of attorneys to han-
dle his estate was merely precatory. 58 Justice Wallace agreed that the court
would impose an equitable charge upon a devise, if the devise were condi-
tioned upon the requirement that the devisee pay a legacy to a third person,
but he found this reasoning inapplicable under the facts in Kelley.59 Justice
Wallace interpreted the disputed clause as an invalid attempt to force two
individuals into an executory personal services contract, 6° as well as an inva-
lid restraint on the widow's right of alienation following the devise of a fee
simple estate. 61
The court underscored the fact that Texas courts will not require magic
language to create a trust in Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. InterFirst Bank.62
The Texas Supreme Court has held that the controlling tests for creating a
trust are language imposing a fiduciary obligation, a clearly identified subject
of that obligation, and clearly identified beneficiaries of the trust.63 Under
these tests the testator in Perfect Union Lodge created a testamentary trust
despite his reference to the executor rather than the trustee. The testator left
a life estate to his wife and required that the executors control and manage
the estate during her lifetime. The court held that the trustee, because of the
obligation to be impartial to both the life tenant and the remaindermen, had
to sell under-productive property it had previously refused to sell.64
In Diemer v. Diemer65 the Houston court of appeals held that the term
57. 714 S.W.2d at 307 (Wallace, J., dissenting). The dissent included much of the same
reasoning as that in the withdrawn opinion, which had been authored by Justice Campbell.
58. Id.; see Mason & Mason v. Brown, 182 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
59. 714 S.W.2d at 307; see also Haldeman v. Openheimer, 103 Tex. 275, 126 S.W. 566
(Tex. 1910) (equitable charge when devisee directed to pay specific legacy); Rubio v. Valdez,
603 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (devise subject to specific
legacy); Conway v. Estes, 346 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1961, no writ) (devise
subject to $1,000 legacy).
60. 714 S.W.2d at 308. Under contract law parties will not be forced into personal fiduci-
ary relationships involving nondelegable duties without mutual consent. See, e.g., Allen v.
Camp, 101 Tex. 260, 260-61, 106 S.W. 315, 316 (1908). Generally, duties are nondelegable if
they involve personal services, artistic skills or other unique abilities, and close personal rela-
tionships, such as the duty owed by an attorney to his client. 714 S.W.2d at 308.
61. 714 S.W.2d at 309-10.
62. 713 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ granted).
63. See McMurray v. Stanley, 69 Tex. 227, 234-35, 6 S.W. 412, 416 (1887); Unthank v.
Rippstein, 386 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. 1964).
64. 713 S.W.2d at 394. A trustee is required to sell property that has been underproduc-
tive for more than a year unless the settlor of the trust has provided otherwise. Property is
considered underproductive "if it does not produce an average annual net income, without
considering depreciation or obsolescence, equal to at least one percent of its value." TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.110(a), (b) (Vernon 1984). This duty of the trustee was not discre-
tionary. 713 S.W.2d at 394.
65. 717 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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"issue," as used in the will in question, did not include adopted children. 66
The court determined that the testator intended to exclude adopted children
because he used the term "issue" in reference to the only one of his children
who had an adopted child but no natural children; in reference to the other
children he employed the term "descendants. '67 By contrast, his wife's codi-
cil defined children to include legally adopted children and included her
adopted grandson even though he was an adult at the time of his adoption.
Two cases construed wills under the well-established rule of construction
that a will speaks from the time of the testator's death and, according to its
terms, passes the estate then owned by the testator. 68 The testatrix in In re
Hite69 devised to her husband "an undivided one-half (/2) of all oil, gas and
mineral royalties to which I might be entitled,"' 70 with the remainder to her
son. The court held that this language entitled her husband only to royalty
interests existing at the time of her death, not to royalties resulting from the
later execution of a lease. 71 The court agreed that a latent ambiguity existed
because the testatrix owned a mineral estate with a potential royalty interest
at the time of her death, and, although a royalty may be created prior to the
creation of an oil and gas lease, the court held that the language used by the
testatrix was insufficient to do so. 72
By contrast, the testatrix in Kokernot v. Denman 73 provided a specific
bequest expressly including after-acquired property. She devised to her
grandsons, "any and all other real estate.., which may be owned by me." 74
The court held that this language sufficed to pass after-acquired property
despite the absence of the words "at my death."'75 The court noted that it
must consider the intent of the testatrix as of the time the will was executed,
but her will speaks as of the time of her death, passing, according to its
terms, the estate she then possessed. 76 Significantly, the decedent's executor
acquired the disputed royalty interest in Hite during estate administration,
while the decedent in Kokernot acquired the real property in controversy
during her lifetime. These decisions are therefore consistent with the Texas
Probate Code, which vests title in devisees as of the moment of a decedent's
66. Id. at 162. The Texas Supreme Court has noted that the term "issue" usually means
blood relationship. See Cutrer v. Cutrer, 162 Tex. 166, 172, 345 S.W.2d 513, 517 (1961).
67. 717 S.W.2d at 162.
68. In re Hite, 700 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Kokernot v. Denman, 708 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see Shriner's Hospital for Crippled Children v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. 1980);
Henderson v. Ryan, 27 Tex. 670, 674 (1864).
69. 700 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
70. Id. at 714 (emphasis by the court).
71. Id. at 717.
72. Id.; see also Watkins v. Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179, 182, 189 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex. 1945)(may create royalty interest by grant or reservation); Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613, 617
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (may create royalty interest by
grant or reservation).
73. 708 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. Id. at 922 (emphasis by the court).





The testator in Daniels v. Moore7 8 granted his wife a life estate in certain
real property, and authorized her to sell and convey the property, reinvest
the proceeds, and use the property or reinvested proceeds during her life-
time. The court held that this grant of a life estate did not authorize the
testator's wife to make an inter vivos gift of the property. 79 The court rea-
soned that the testator's reference to reinvested proceeds evidenced his intent
that she retain the estate; a gift of the property would therefore defeat his
intent as well as the interests of the remaindermen. 80 Conversely, the testator
in Crum v. Taylor Exploration, Inc.81 utilized broader language in the joint
will granting a life estate to his wife, with the remaining property to be di-
vided equally among his children. His wife and son, as co-executors, were
empowered to manage, control, and dispose of all property, authority that
the court held extended to their ability to convey to the son a fee simple
interest in a portion of the life estate.8 2 Small differences in wording clearly
have a marked impact on the capacity of a life tenant to make conveyances
of assets that are subject to the life estate. In Crum the testator referred to
the property remaining after the life estate expired, language suggesting that
he anticipated inter vivos conveyances of property subject to the life estate.
The testator in Daniels, however, spoke of a remainder that included the
proceeds from inter vivos conveyances reinvested in the estate, suggesting
that he intended the life estate to remain intact.8 3
In Parker v. Henderson 84 the testators of a joint will died of natural causes
within four days of each other. Their grandchildren, who were the children
of a deceased son, contended that the simultaneous death clause referring to
a common accident or catastrophe was inapplicable. The court disagreed,
however, relying on the presumption of a common accident included in the
will if the testators died within sixty days of each other and the general rule
that a testamentary disposition is preferred over intestacy.85 The will stated
77. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
78. 712 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
79. Id. at 622.
80. Id.; see Messer v. Johnson, 422 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tex. 1968).
81. 710 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
82. Id. at 827; see Harrell v. Hickerman, 147 Tex. 396, 401, 215 S.W.2d 876, 878 (1948);
Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307, 312, 184 S.W.2d 823, 825 (1945). The Crum court further
held that the testator's son was a permissible grantee, despite the prohibition in TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 352 (Vernon Supp. 1987) against a personal representative purchasing estate
assets, because this conveyance had been made as an estate distribution pursuant to a long-
standing dispositive plan established during the testator's lifetime. 710 S.W.2d at 827.
83. This difference is underscored by the fact that in Crum the dispositive scheme to
equalize the community estate among all eight children had begun during the spouses' life-
times and was undoubtedly expected to continue during the lifetime of the survivor as well.
84. 712 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ granted) [Editor's Note:
The Texas supreme Court reversed this case after this Article went to print. 728 S.W.2d 768
(Tex. 1987).].
85. Id. at 226. By executing a will a testator creates the presumption that he intends to
dispose of his assets and does not intend that all or part of them pass by intestacy. Shriner's
Hospital v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. 1980). Consequently, if a will may be construed
either way, the construction avoiding intestacy is preferred. Id.; Howard v. McCulley, 686
S.W.2d 650, 652 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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that all property was devised "unto our surviving children of this mar-
riage,'' 86 followed by specific devises of land to each son, including the son
who predeceased the testators. The testators concluded by stating it was
their intent to divide the land equally between their three sons. Granting a
summary judgment, the trial court determined that the deceased son's chil-
dren would inherit his devise pursuant to the anti-lapse statute of the Pro-
bate Code.87 The appellate court reversed, relying on the Texas Supreme
Court decision in Perry v. Hinshaw,88 in which the court gave the survivor-
ship language its common meaning of living beyond another's life. 89 In ren-
dering its decision in Parker, however, the appellate court recognized that a
cogent argument construing the will in favor of individual gifts to each son
existed, 90 supported by the theory that the "surviving children of this mar-
riage" referred to children living at the time the testators signed their will.9'
The appellate court in Parker, nevertheless, deferred to the Perry decision as
the most recent statement by the Texas Supreme Court interpreting survi-
vorship language. 92 Thus, the two surviving sons in Parker inherited the
entire estate, to the exclusion of their deceased brother's children.
The court in Gregg v. Jones93 also construed survivorship language. In
that case the testatrix passed the residue of her estate to her husband, any
surviving children, "or the survivors or survivor of them. ' 94 The court inter-
preted this language to mean that the bequest passed to surviving class mem-
bers, and because no class members survived, the residue passed by
intestacy.95 The court rejected the argument that the residue should pass to
the husband's heirs as survivors of the class members designated under the
will and, as in Parker, gave the term "survivor" its usual meaning of an
individual who lives after the death of another.96
Property also passed by the law of descent and distribution in Renaud v.
86. 712 S.W.2d at 225 (emphasis by the court).
87. The trial court offered no explanation for its decision. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68
(Vernon 1980) protects descendants of a testator by providing that a devise to a child or other
descendant who predeceases the testator, leaving surviving descendants, shall not lapse, but
shall vest in those surviving descendants.
88. 633 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1982).
89. Id. at 505.
90. Individual gifts to descendants that are not conditioned upon survivorship will fall
within the scope of the Texas anti-lapse statute. 712 S.W.2d at 226 n. 1.
91. Id. at 227. The appellees also convincingly argued that Perry v. Hinshaw could be
distinguished on the grounds that in Perry the testator's intent was readily discernable. The
testator stated that the surviving siblings were to share and share alike, and the term "surviv-
ing" modified both references to brothers and sisters. 633 S.W.2d at 504. In Parker the spe-
cific devises to each son did not contain survivorship language, and the testators clearly stated
that they intended to divide the land equally between their three sons. 712 S.W.2d at 225. The
appellate court conceded that a construction of individual gifts not conditioned by survivor-
ship might readily be made. Id. at 227.
92. 712 S.W.2d at 227.
93. 699 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
94. Id. at 379 (emphasis by the court).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 379-80; see also Caognard v. Tarnke, 202 S.W. 221, 221-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1918, no writ) (survivor is alive after death of another); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1297 (5th ed. 1979) (survivor remains alive after others' deaths).
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Renaud,97 in which the testator failed to provide for the disposition of a
testamentary trust for his daughter if she survived beyond a given date. The
presumption against intestacy when an individual makes a will9 8 is ineffec-
tive when the testator does not completely dispose of his property.99 In
Renaud the unambiguous terms of the will directed the disposition of trust
assets if the beneficiary died prior to the specified date, but, by oversight or
by design, did not provide for the contingency that she might live beyond
that date. The court refused to find that the testator intended to pass the
remaining trust assets to the trust beneficiary and held that the assets would
pass by intestacy.100
The court based its decision in Stewart v. RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. 101 on
the general rule that a testator's right to devise his property is subject to the
limitations imposed by public policy. 10 2 The testator provided that if named
individuals were appointed guardians of his minor nieces, the nieces would
have to forfeit their interests in a testamentary trust. The Fort Worth court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that this clause was void as
against public policy, because upholding the clause would cause a forfeiture
based on the action of a probate court acting in the minors' best interests.103
The court in First Methodist Church v. Wright 104 construed whether lan-
guage in a will constituted a bequest or merely a statement clarifying the
ownership of property. The testatrix prefaced certain clauses in her will by
stating, "For the guidance of my Executor .. . and for the purpose of
preventing any possible dispute with reference to my estate, I make the fol-
lowing statements . ... 105 She then noted that all properties under her
possession and control, other than her home, were owned one-half by the
remaindermen under her husband's will, subject to her life estate, and one-
half by herself in fee simple. The trial court construed this language as a
bequest to her deceased husband's beneficiaries of one-half of the property
she described. The church, as the beneficiary of her residuary estate, ap-
pealed, on the basis that the paragraph in question was not a bequest, but
was only a statement alerting her executor that she held a life estate in assets
under her husband's will. The appellate court agreed with the church, find-
ing no conveyance language sufficient to constitute a bequest or devise. 106
97. 707 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
98. For a discussion of the presumption against intestacy see Carr v. Rogers, 383 S.W.2d
383, 384 (Tex. 1964).
99. See Haile v. Holtzclaw, 414 S.W.2d 916, 922 (Tex. 1967).
100. 707 S.W.2d at 755.
101. 698 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
102. Id. at 787.
103. Id. Texas courts have upheld conditional testamentary gifts that did not result in
forfeiture when a legitimate purpose for the condition existed. See Jenkins v. First Nat'l Bank,
107 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1939).
104. 706 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
105. Id. at 721.
106. Id. at 722. Although technical words of conveyance are not required to pass title to
property, the will must contain language showing clear testamentary intent that the property is
to pass to a named beneficiary. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 229 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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The court held that the language merely explained the status of the assets in
the possession of the testatrix.10 7 The appellate court therefore reversed,
remanding the case for a determination by the trial court of the ownership
and distribution of the assets held by the testatrix as required under Texas
Probate Code section 378(c).108
Relying on First Methodist Church v. Wright, the court in Knesek v.
Witte 109 held that the testatrix failed to make a testamentary disposition
when she directed a partition of property and erroneously described its sta-
tus in her will. 110 The testatrix had received her husband's entire estate in
fee simple pursuant to reciprocal wills in which each had named the other
and then the same designated family members, largely her husband's rela-
tives, as beneficiaries. In a will executed subsequent to her husband's death,
the testatrix erroneously stated that she had received certain property sub-
ject to a life estate, with her husband's relatives as remaindermen. She then
directed her executor to partition the property so that the remaindermen
under her husband's will would receive their share, as would her devisees
and legatees. The court construed the unambiguous terms of the will and
clarified that, although the court must derive the intent only from the lan-
guage used, the court may consider extrinsic evidence of facts and circum-
stances at the time the testatrix executed her will relating to her situation. II
The court agreed that the testatrix in Knesek was mistaken as to the nature
of the interest devised to her under her husband's will, but held that this
error would not permit the trial court to re-write the will and insert a devise
where none existed.11 2 The remaindermen to whom the testatrix referred in
her will received no assets under her husband's will and, accordingly, they
were not entitled to any portion of the partitioned property. Under this con-
struction, the devisees under her will, who were her family members, would
receive her entire estate. The court, therefore, reversed the trial court deci-
sion in favor of her husband's family, but remanded for a new trial to deter-
mine whether the testatrix and her husband had executed the original
reciprocal wills pursuant to a contract.' 13 If so, the testatrix, following her
107. 706 S.W.2d at 723. An incorrect statement in a will as to the status of property will
not alter its status as between separate or community, or constitute an implied gift or devise.
Carriere v. Bodungen, 500 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ).
108. 706 S.W.2d at 722-23. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 378 (Vernon 1980) provides that,
"If the court is of the opinion that the estate should be partitioned and distributed, it shall
enter a decree which shall state: . . . (c) A full description of all the estate to be distributed."
In order to state the description and to distribute estate assets the trial court must determine
the ownership of property listed on the inventory prepared by the estate's executor. 706
S.W.2d at 722-23. The appellate court in Wright remanded the case for this purpose. Id. at
723.
109. 715 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
110. Id. at 196.
111. Id.;see Stewart v. Selder, 473 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Tex. 1971); Houston Bank & Trust Co. v.
Lansdowne, 201 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
112. 715 S.W.2d at 196.
113. Id. at 199. Mutual wills between a husband and wife, with identity of wording, dis-
positive plan, and time of execution have often led courts to conclude that the spouses exe-
cuted their wills pursuant to a contractual agreement. Id. at 198. Note that the statutory
requirement that wills expressly state that a contract exists applies only to wills signed on or
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husband's death, would have violated their agreement by executing a new
will naming different beneficiaries.1 14
When three of four remainder beneficiaries in Moody v. Pitts1 5 conveyed
their interests to their mother, who was the life tenant and trustee under her
husband's will, the trial court held that the trust failed due to the merger of
legal and equitable interests. 116 The appellate court disagreed with this con-
clusion because the outstanding vested remainder of the fourth child pre-
vented such a merger.117 The testator had named his wife trustee and
granted her broad powers of sale and conveyance, coupled with the power to
invade the corpus for her support in her accustomed manner of living. The
child who had retained her remainder interest sought to have her mother's
conveyances of trust property to other children declared void, as a violation
of the spendthrift trust clause. Construing the unambiguous terms of the
will, the court held that the trustee's conveyances were not in bad faith and
did not violate any provision of the trust, particularly if the sales would
make the property produce income for the benefit of the life tenant. 118 The
remainder beneficiary's interest was fully protected because the sale proceeds
became subject to the life estate. 119 The sole remainder beneficiary had
hoped to receive specific real property in her father's estate and consequently
argued that she was entitled to her interest in the life estate as it existed at
the time of her father's death and that the trial court had erred in determin-
ing that her interest vested instead at the time of her mother's death. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court on this point, because the vested
remainder was defeasible if a remainder beneficiary with no descendants pre-
deceased the life tenant, or if the trustee consumed the entire life estate
under the authority in the will. 120 The court, therefore, refused to place a
constructive trust on the real estate conveyed by the trustee. 21 In her last
argument, the remainder beneficiary alleged that the trustee breached her
fiduciary duty when she commingled trust funds with personal funds. The
court reminded the remainder beneficiary that her interest was only in the
life estate existing at the time of her mother's death, and assured her that the
after September 1, 1979. Weimers v. Weimers, 683 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1984); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 59A (Vernon 1980). The wills in Knesek were executed on September 29, 1975.
114. See Weidner v. Crowther, 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957).
115. 708 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
116. Id. at 934. Generally, if legal and equitable interests are held by one person, he holds
it free of trust. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.034(b) (Vernon 1984).
117. 708 S.W.2d at 934. Due to the outstanding remainder interest, the court did not need
to address the statutory exception to the merger doctrine. Legal and equitable interests in a
trust may not merge in a beneficiary other than the settlor if the settlor has created a spend-
thrift trust. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.034(c) (Vernon 1984). The beneficiary's interest in
the Moody v. Pitts trust was protected under a spendthrift provision.
118. 708 S.W.2d at 935.
119. Id. at 936-37; see also Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307, 311, 184 S.W.2d 823, 826 (1945)
(proceeds of sale by life tenant remain in estate).
120. 708 S.W.2d at 936; see also Power v. Landram, 464 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1970) (re-
maindermen predeceasing life tenant, without issue, receive nothing from estate). A remainder
interest will vest regardless of the life tenant's power of sale. Caples v. Ward, 107 Tex. 341,
345-46, 179 S.W. 856, 858 (1915).
121. 708 S.W.2d at 937-38.
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life estate would include all commingled funds. 122
Nuncupative Wills. During his last hospitalization, the decedent in Kay v.
Sandler 123 asked his attorney to prepare a new will, but the decedent died
before he was able to sign. The appellant offered the draft of the new will as
a nuncupative will revoking the prior signed will. For a valid nuncupative
will, the Texas Probate Code requires that, when the value of the decedent's
estate exceeds thirty dollars, three credible witnesses substantially agree to
the oral disposition made by the testator. g2 4 The testimony offered by the
appellant consisted of testimony by the decedent's attorney, in which the
attorney stated that the decedent never declared that he was making an oral
will. Additionally, the appellant offered the affidavits of two other witnesses
to the effect that the decedent indicated he had made or intended to make a
new will after his visit with his attorney. The court held that the appellant
had failed to provide three credible witnesses to substantially support the
drafted will, and as a matter of law the alleged nuncupative will therefore
failed to comply with that requirement of the Probate Code. 125 Absent a
valid nuncupative will the court did not reach the issue, unsettled in Texas
law, of whether a nuncupative will revokes a prior written will. 126
II. LIFE ESTATES
Undue influence and fraud in the inducement frequently are key issues
addressed in will contests. The court addressed these same issues in Novak
v. Schellenberg,127 in a suit to invalidate an inter vivos conveyance of a life
estate. In 1967 the appellant's parents executed a deed of gift of the family
farm, conveying an undivided one-third interest in the remainder to the ap-
pellant individually and an undivided two-thirds interest in the remainder to
the appellant as trustee for her two brothers, and retaining a life estate. In
1981 the appellant's parents executed an instrument conveying their life es-
tate to her, but in 1983 they attempted to set aside both the 1981 conveyance
and their earlier appointment of her as trustee.1 28 The appellant argued
122. Id. at 937; see also General Ass'n of Davidian Seventh Day Adventists, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Ass'n of Davidian Seventh Day Adventists, 410 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (all commingled funds become subject to trust).
123. 718 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
124. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 65 (Vernon 1980) provides:
No nuncupative will shall be established unless it be made in the time of the last
sickness of the deceased, at his home or where he has resided for ten days or
more next preceding the date of such will, except when the deceased is taken
sick away from home and dies before he returns to such home; nor when the
value exceeds Thirty Dollars, unless it be proved by three credible witnesses that
the testator called on a person to take notice or bear testimony that such is his
will, or words of like import.
See also id. § 86 (detailing the proof necessary to validate a nuncupative will).
125. 718 S.W.2d at 875.
126. Id.
127. 718 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
128. A court may remove a trustee after a hearing if, in the court's discretion, removal is
deemed necessary. Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. 1983); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 113.082 (Vernon 1984).
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that, despite her parents' testimony that they believed they were signing a
hospital bill when they signed the instrument conveying the life estate, her
parents failed to prove undue influence. She contended that their minds
were not subverted to or overcome by her will, an essential element in estab-
lishing undue influence. Affirming the trial court's judgment in favor of the
appellees, the appellate court clarified that the rule in Texas in a suit to
invalidate an instrument is that fraud in the inducement and undue influence
are treated as one, with undue influence being merely a species of fraud. 129
The elements necessary to establish an oral life estate in real property
arose in the context of a divorce in Carley v. Carley. 30 The appellant and
appellee had moved onto a farm owned by the appellant's parents at the
parents' request to assist them as needed in the future. In return, the parents
promised the couple they could live on the farm for their lifetimes, and that
the appellant would receive title at the death of both his parents. Despite the
requirement that an interest in land must comply with the statute of
frauds, 31 the court held that the appellant had an enforceable life estate. ' 32
The Texas Supreme Court in Hooks v. Bridgewater133 determined that an
oral interest in real property was enforceable if the transferee paid considera-
tion, in money or in services, took possession of the property, and, with the
transferor's consent, made permanent and valuable improvements. 34 The
appellant in Carley promised to care for his parents, moved onto the farm,
and built a home on farm property, thus satisfying all three tests. He there-
fore had a separate property interest in the farm, and, upon divorce, his wife
was entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the community funds ex-
pended to enhance the value of the appellant's life estate. 135
III. NONTESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS
Joint Accounts. Isbell v. Williams 136 involved an interpleader action to re-
solve the issue of ownership of funds deposited in a savings and loan account
as between the named beneficiaries or the executor of the decedent's estate.
The decedent had used joint savings account cards to open two accounts
naming herself as trustee for two named beneficiaries. Consistent with Pro-
bate Code section 439,' 37 the deposit agreement contained a specific survi-
129. 718 S.W.2d at 824; see Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963); Curry
v. Curry, 153 Tex. 421, 431, 270 S.W.2d 208, 214 (1954); Finch v. McVea, 543 S.W.2d 449,
452 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
130. 705 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
131. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.0 1(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987); see also Truitt v.
Wilkinson, 379 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, no writ) (life estate must
be created in accordance with statute of frauds).
132. 705 S.W.2d at 373.
133. 111 Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921).
134. Id. at 126-27, 229 S.W. at 1116.
135. 705 S.W.2d at 374. The court disagreed with the appellee's contention that she was
entitled to one-half of the current market value of the home. Id.
136. 705 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
137. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon 1980). The decedent must have signed a
written agreement in order to create a valid survivorship account; the creation of a joint ac-
count alone will not lead to the inference that a survivorship agreement existed. Id.
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vorship provision, but the right-of-survivorship language referred to the
"undersigned as joint tenants." 138 Only the decedent had signed the agree-
ment, rendering the survivorship language irrelevant. Despite the decedent's
defective attempt to create a survivorship account, the named beneficiaries
contended that they, rather than the executor, were entitled to the funds
because the accounts were trust funds for their benefit. The trial court
agreed, since the jury found that the decedent intended the funds to pass to
the beneficiaries upon her death. 139 The court of appeals reversed and held
that the decedent's intent was not controlling.140 The test for creation of a
trust account is found in Probate Code section 436(14),141 which requires
that the settlor establish a trust account by the form of the account and the
deposit agreement.
The court in Sawyer v. Lancaster 142 also addressed the issue of whether a
decedent created a valid survivorship account. Affirming a summary judg-
ment in favor of the surviving depositor, the court held that under Probate
Code section 439(a) 143 the bank signature card directing payment to the sur-
vivor created a rebuttable presumption of joint tenancy with right of survi-
vorship, which the appellant's evidence had not overcome. 44 Absent
express language of joint tenancy with right of survivorship, Texas courts
have held that "payable to the survivor" language is merely sufficient to raise
the presumption that the depositor intended a survivorship account.145 In
Sawyer evidence that the depositor intended to create a convenience account
rather than a survivorship account was therefore admissible, but was insuffi-
cient to overcome the presumption created by the "payable" language. 146
In Texas community property may not be used to create a valid joint ten-
ancy with right of survivorship.147 The couple in First Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Ritenour148 partitioned their community interests in a
certificate of deposit, as permitted by the Texas Probate Code, 149 and estab-
lished it as a valid survivorship account. Despite the bank's representation
to the husband that the bank would place a hold on the account requiring
both spouses' signatures for a withdrawal, the wife alone withdrew and dissi-
pated in excess of $11,000. The court held that the husband was a consumer
138. 705 S.W.2d at 254.
139. Id. at 256.
140. Id. at 257. The decedent's intent would have been the controlling issue prior to the
passage of the nontestamentary provisions of the Texas Trust Code. See Citizens Nat'l Bank v.
Allen, 575 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
141. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 436(14) (Vernon 1980). The appellate court remanded the
case for a determination of the factual issue of whether the form of the account, the deposit
agreement, and parol evidence to clarify ambiguities were together sufficient to comply with
these statutory requirements. 705 S.W.2d at 257.
142. 719 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon 1980).
144. 719 S.W.2d at 349.
145. See, e.g., Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 551, 359 S.W.2d 48, 51-52 (1962).
146. 719 S.W.2d at 350.
147. See, e.g., Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1966).
148. 704 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
149. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act150 and sustained actual damages to
him of the full amount used by his wife.' 51 First Federal contended that,
pursuant to the partition, the husband suffered damages only to the extent of
one-half of the total amount. A joint tenant takes full title to the assets,
however, by the instrument creating a valid joint tenancy. 152 As a result, the
court held that the husband had full title to all funds in the account and,
contrary to his agreement with First Federal, was damaged to the full extent
of funds disbursed to his wife. 153
The court in Ashmore v. Carter 154 addressed life insurance beneficiary des-
ignations and payments. The court held that a trial court determination that
life insurance proceeds were community property, payable to the decedent's
estate as the designated beneficiary, did not constitute fraud on the dece-
dent's second wife. 15  The appellant presented no evidence of fraud on ap-
peal, and, in fact, the decedent had made generous provisions for his wife
elsewhere. 156
Due to an error in the name on the life insurance beneficiary designation,
the court in Oates v. Hodge 157 permitted extrinsic evidence that the insured
intended to establish the identity of the proper beneficiary. 158 The court
noted that the designation of an individual as the beneficiary raised a pre-
sumption that the insured intended that individual to receive the insurance
proceeds. 159 In Oates the court found that, after the insured designated Eve-
lyn Hodge, whose actual name was Evelyn Oates, as his beneficiary, the fact
of the insured's marriage to another woman was irrelevant, as was the fact
that he had signed but not personally filled in the beneficiary's name on the
designation form, because the court received no evidence of impropriety in
obtaining the decedent's signature. 160
Similarly, in Reyes v. Salinas 161 the court awarded the insurance proceeds
to the named beneficiary despite the insured's inaccurate designation of his
150. 704 S.W.2d at 900. A consumer is "an individual . . . who seeks or acquires by
purchase or lease, any goods or services. ... TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4)
(Vernon Supp. 1987).
151. 704 S.W.2d at 900.
152. See Calvert v. Wallrath, 457 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. 1970).
153. 704 S.W.2d at 900. In addition, because each joint tenant has the right to withdraw
the entire amount in a joint tenancy account, the court reversed the judgment against Mrs.
Ritenour for having withdrawn the funds in question. Id. at 901.
154. 716 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
155. Id. at 174.
156. The decedent had designated his wife as the sole beneficiary of his Individual Retire-
ment Account (IRA). The decedent's daughter argued that Internal Revenue Code § 2039(e)
prohibits exclusion of IRA proceeds from an estate, but the court correctly pointed out that
this Internal Revenue Code provision addresses the exclusion of IRA proceeds from a dece-
dent's gross estate for purposes of calculating the estate's federal tax liability only. 716 S.W.2d
at 173.
157. 713 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
158. Id. at 363.
159. Id. at 364. The insured's intent controls the disposition of the insurance proceeds.
Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 139 Tex. 101, 109, 161 S.W.2d 1057, 1061 (1942).
160. 713 S.W.2d at 364.
161. 709 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
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wife as the beneficiary. 162 The court held that the insured's designation of
his wife was descriptive only, when the court could clearly identify the bene-
ficiary.' 63 In two additional insurance cases, named beneficiaries forfeited
their rights to life insurance proceeds by willfully causing the deaths of the
insured parties. 164
IV. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
Jurisdiction. In Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp.' 65 the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the complex issue of probate court jurisdiction in the context of
the defendant's contention that a decedent's mental anguish is a matter inci-
dent to an estate within the probate court's exclusive jurisdiction, rendering
the district court an improper forum in which to litigate the issue. The court
had recently determined, in Seay v. Hall,166 that survival claims were not
matters incident to an estate under Probate Code section 5A(b).1 67 Revers-
ing the appellate court, the court therefore held that at the time of trial the
district court had jurisdiction over the claim for the decedent's mental
anguish.168 In a footnote, however, the court noted that:
[T]he legislature has amended § 5A(b) to add the following sentence.
"In actions by or against a personal representative, the statutory pro-
bate courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts." Tex.
Prob. Code Ann. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986). The district court is
still a proper forum for survival actions under this amendment. ' 69
In this footnote the court observed that the district court is a proper forum
rather than the proper forum for survival actions.170 This footnote may clar-
ify the construction issues raised by the addition to Probate Code section
5A(b), in light of the preceding sentence in that section: "In situations
where the jurisdiction of a statutory probate court is concurrent with that of
the district court, any cause of action appertaining to estates or incident to
an estate shall be brought in a statutory probate court rather than in the
district court."' 171
162. Id. at 33.
163. Id.
164. See Seedig v. Dennis, 701 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); see also
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.23 (Vernon 1981) (interest ends if beneficiary is accomplice or
principal in insured's death).
165. 703 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1986).
166. 677 S.W.2d 19, 25 (Tex. 1984).
167. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987) includes as matters incident to
an estate:
[T]he probate of wills, the issuance of letters testamentary and of administra-
tion, and the determination of heirship, and also include, but are not limited to,
all claims by or against an estate, all actions for trial of title to land and for the
enforcement of liens thereon, all actions for trial of the right of property, all
actions to construe wills, the interpretation and administration of testamentary
trusts and the applying of constructive trusts, and generally all matters relating
to the settlement, partition, and distribution of estates of wards and deceased
persons.
168. 703 S.W.2d at 634.
169. Id. n.1.
170. Id.
171. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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While interpreting the legislative addition as vesting exclusive jurisdiction
of any action by or against a personal representative in a statutory probate
court is possible, the court's language would appear to construe the addition
as establishing concurrent jurisdiction with the district court. Further, the
court would appear to be observing that, assuming that concurrent jurisdic-
tion did exist in Yowell, the claim for mental anguish was not a matter
mandatorily brought in a statutory probate court, because it was not a mat-
ter incident to an estate. Unresolved is the construction issue concerning
whether a statutory probate court may now exercise its concurrent jurisdic-
tion over a survival claim as an action by or against a personal representa-
tive, rather than as an action incident to an estate.
When concurrent jurisdiction clearly exists, the court in Williams v. Scan-
lan 172 held that deference to the first court to acquire jurisdiction is a judi-
cial imperative. 7 3 The district court in Williams had acquired jurisdiction
over a divorce proceeding that became probate in nature when a temporary
guardian of the person and estate of one party was sought in probate court.
Agreeing that the probate court had jurisdiction to appoint a temporary
guardian of an incapacitated person, the court cited its decision in Pullen v.
Swanson, 174 in which it had held that Probate Code section 5A175 does not
completely divest district courts of jurisdiction to hear matters incident to an
estate.1 76 Because the district court had initially obtained jurisdiction in
Williams, and because the probate court could not grant all of the requested
relief due to lack of jurisdiction, the court held that the probate court's exer-
cise of jurisdiction over the estate was inappropriate. 177
With similar reasoning, the court in Speer v. Stover 178 held that dominant
jurisdiction was vested in the probate court because that court had acquired
jurisdiction over a suit with which the district court had concurrent jurisdic-
tion before suit was filed in the district court. 179 The court rejected the con-
tention that the suit for specific performance properly belonged in the
district court because the estate involved had not yet had an administrator
appointed. ' 80 The court observed that, consistent with the rule that jurisdic-
tion in a probate matter vests upon the opening of probate,18' the probate
court acquired jurisdiction at the time an application for letters of adminis-
tration was filed, not several months later when the order appointing the
administrator was entered.' 82 Further, the court held that the suit for spe-
172. 714 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
173. Id. at 40.
174. 667 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
175. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A (Vernon 1980 & Vernon Supp. 1987).
176. 667 S.W.2d at 364.
177. 667 S.W.2d at 40. The court therefore granted a conditional writ of mandamus, to
issue in the event the probate court judge did not vacate his order appointing a temporary
guardian. Id.
178. 711 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
179. Id. at 739.
180. Id. at 738.
181. See Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
182. 711 S.W.2d at 738-39.
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cific performance seeking the conveyance of real property belonging to an
estate being administered through probate proceedings is properly heard in
the probate court as a matter incident to an estate. 18 The subject matter of
the suit clearly related to the settlement, partition, and distribution of the
estate of a deceased person. For purposes of the determination of whether
the matter was incident to an estate, the failure to name the estate as a party
to the suit was irrelevant. 184
Irrespective of which court first acquires jurisdiction, the Texas Probate
Code requires that in counties without a statutory probate court, county
court at law, or other statutory court exercising probate jurisdiction, con-
tested probate matters shall be transferred to the district court on the motion
of any party.185 The court in InterFirst Bank v. Henderson 186 accordingly
reversed the trial court's refusal to transfer probate proceedings involving a
will contest to district court. 187
Standing. The supreme court remanded to the trial court the issue of
whether the bank in InterFirst Bank v. Henderson had standing as a testa-
mentary trustee to contest the probate of a second will.' 88 Texas courts had
previously characterized an "interested person" in the context of the Probate
Code189 as a party, other than a creditor, entitled to share in the estate,
absolutely or contingently, 190 and as a party with a pecuniary interest that
would be affected by the probate or defeat of the will. 19 1 Alternatively, the
court observed that other jurisdictions have distinguished between the roles
of executor and trustee on the basis that the executor merely possesses and
administers assets prior to distribution, while a trustee receives legal title to
assets and, in that respect, stands in the same position as a legatee under the
will. 192 Without deciding the issue, the court cited with approval an analysis
by a Montana court granting standing to a trustee only if the interests of the
beneficiaries represented by the trustee were adversely affected by a subse-
183. Id. at 738.
184. Id. The court noted that a plea for alternative relief, in itself not a matter incident to
an estate, was within the probate court's jurisdiction if the primary claim was a matter incident
to an estate. Further, the court pointed out that a county court sitting as a probate court had
no monetary jurisdictional limitations and could therefore provide the same relief as a district
court. Id.
185. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
186. 719 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no writ). The trial court had denied a
motion to transfer the probate proceedings to district court and had entered an order dis-
missing the will contest. Subsequently, the appellate court denied the bank's application for a
writ of mandamus to require the transfer, on the grounds that the bank's recourse was an
appeal from a final judgment. InterFirst Bank v. Fields, 706 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1986, no writ).
187. 719 S.W.2d at 643.
188. Id.
189. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(r) (Vernon 1980) defines interested persons as: "[H]eirs,
devisees, spouses, creditors, or any others having a property right in, or claim against, the
estate being administered .... The validity of a will admitted to probate may be contested
within two years by "any interested person." Id. § 93 (Vernon 1980).
190. Appleby v. Tom, 170 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1942, no writ).
191. Logan v. Thomason, 146 Tex. 37, 41-42, 202 S.W.2d 212, 215 (1947).




Appealability. Prior to the final distribution in an estate administration, cer-
tain probate court orders may be appealable by adjudicating substantial
rights of various parties.194 Such appealable orders include the declaration
of heirship and the denial of an application to probate a will. 1 95 The court in
Grounds v. Lett,196 however, held that a probate court's orders concerning
venue and jurisdiction in a suit affecting title to land were interlocutory and
appealable upon final judgment.1 97 An order construing only certain por-
tions of a will without disposing of all parties and issues and an order deny-
ing a motion for summary judgment were also held to be interlocutory in
Bogs v. Bogs. 198 By contrast, an appeal in a probate matter is authorized if
the judgment finally disposes of and is conclusive of the issue for which that
portion of the proceeding was brought. 199 The partial summary judgment in
Kay v. Sandler2°° admitting into probate the decedent's signed will, and ef-
fectively denying probate to the nuncupative will submitted by appellant,
resolved all issues in the will contest and therefore constituted a final, ap-
pealable judgment.20 1
Damages. In a case of first impression, the Texas Supreme Court in Yowell
v. Piper Aircraft Corp.202 held that loss of inheritance damages in wrongful
death cases are recoverable. 20 3 The court noted that these damages compen-
sate heirs for the pecuniary loss they suffer to the extent the decedent would
have accumulated assets they would have inherited at his natural death.2°4
Because a decedent's estate has no cause of action for the loss of future earn-
ings, the court reasoned that loss of inheritance damages did not afford
plaintiffs a double recovery. 20 5 The court defined loss of inheritance dam-
ages in Texas as: "[T]he present value that the deceased, in reasonable
probability, would have added to the estate and left at natural death to the
statutory wrongful death beneficiaries but for the wrongful act causing the
193. Id.; see In re Estate of Maricich, 140 Mont. 319, 371 P.2d 354, 356 (1962).
194. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 55(a) (Vernon 1980).
195. See Mossier v. Johnson, 565 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
196. 718 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
197. Id. at 39.
198. 703 S.W.2d 407, 409-10 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
199. See White v. Pope, 664 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
All final orders of courts exercising original probate jurisdiction are appealable to the courts of
appeals. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(e) (Vernon 1980).
200. 718 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
201. Id. at 874. Appellant had also requested the appointment of a temporary administra-
tor pending the will contest. Although the summary judgment did not address this issue, the
court took judicial notice of its decision in Kay v. Sandler, 704 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which this issue had been resolved. See infra
notes 237-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the requirements for a nuncupative
will, see supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
202. 703 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1986).
203. Id. at 633.




premature death." 20 6 While prejudgment interest is recoverable in wrongful
death cases, the court denied such interest for unaccrued damages such as
loss of inheritance. 20 7 In Yowell the court also reversed the appellate court's
denial of damages for loss of society, companionship, and affection. 20 8 In so
doing, the court extended its holding in Sanchez v. Schindler,20 9 which rec-
ognized a parent's right to recover the loss of companionship and society at
the death of a minor child.2 10 In Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc. 211
the court extended the Sanchez decision to all wrongful death beneficiaries,
including parents of deceased adult children. 2 12
Orders/Judgments. In Andrews v. Koch 2 13 the Texas Supreme Court held
that a probate court, after authorizing a contract for the sale of estate prop-
erty that included an easement, may later enter a nunc pro tunc order to
reform the administrators' deed to include the easement. 2 14 Reversing the
appellate court, the court determined that the error omitting the easement
from the administrators' deed was clerical rather than judicial, and the error
was thus permissibly reformed by a nunc pro tunc order.2 15
A court order approving an inventory is not effective to alter the owner-
ship of property, 216 nor is an inventory conclusive evidence of title.217 The
court, therefore, in Balaban v. Balaban2 18 held that the probate inventory
including certain real property in a decedent's intestate estate did not estop
his son from questioning title to that property. 2 19 The court also determined
that in his trespass to try title action against his siblings to establish title to
the property in question, the acceptance of benefits from the estate did not
estop the decedent's son.2 2 0
206. Id. at 633. The court clarified that a wrongful death beneficiary would be denied loss
of inheritance damages if, in the jury's opinion, the decedent would not have accumulated
assets, or would have outlived the beneficiary. Id. Justice McGee dissented from the recovery
of loss of inheritance damages on the grounds that such damages are too speculative. Id. at
636 (McGee, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 636.
208. Id. at 635-36.
209. 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
210. Id. at 254.
211. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
212. Id. at 551.
213. 702 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1986).
214. Id. at 586.
215. Id. The court distinguished between clerical errors that do not result from judicial
reasoning or determination and judicial errors that involve the exercise of the court's judg-
ment. Id. at 585.
216. See Smith v. Buss, 135 Tex. 566, 571, 144 S.W.2d 529, 532 (1940); Anderson v. An-
derson, 535 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
217. See Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 548, 359 S.W.2d 48, 50 (1962).
218. 712 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. Id. at 780.
220. Id. The court noted that the decedent's son had accepted only those benefits due to
him and was therefore not estopped from asserting title. See Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 472,
234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950).
1987]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Statute of Limitations. In Klein v. Dimock,221 companion cases concerning a
decedent's execution of two wills, the court characterized an application to
probate an earlier will as a will contest, subject to a two-year statute of limi-
tations, 222 and conversely determined that an application to probate a later
will was not a contest of the prior will, but was a proceeding under Probate
Code section 83(b), 223 governed by the four-year statute of limitations.224
The decedent in Klein had, in 1961, executed a joint will with his wife, which
was duly probated upon her death. Thereafter, in 1981, the decedent exe-
cuted a second will, revoking the joint will and modifying the first dispositive
scheme. Following the decedent's death, the probate court admitted the
1981 will to probate. In the same year, the appellants filed a suit to contest
the 1981 will, but the appellants did not file an application to probate the
1961 will until more than two years later, nor did they implead all necessary
and indispensible parties within two years. Appealing the trial court deter-
mination that the two-year statute of limitations barred the will contest, the
appellants contended that their action was a proceeding described in Probate
Code section 83(b), pertaining to a second application to probate a will after
a first will has been admitted to probate, and as such was governed by the
four-year statute of limitations. The appellate court disagreed, affirming the
trial court decision to dismiss, on the ground that the appellants' action was
a direct attack on the later will, governed by the two-year limitations period
for will contests. 225 The court pointed out that the probate of a later will has
been held to be a section 83(b) proceeding rather than a contest of the prior
will, because the probate of a later will, if it revokes all others, has the inci-
dental effect of revoking the probate of the prior will.226 The application to
probate an earlier will, however, as an attempt to set aside a later will revok-
ing all prior wills, was clearly a direct attack on the later will in the nature of
a will contest, governed by a two-year limitations period.227
Executors and Administrators. The executor of an estate in Texas has both
the right to possession of estate assets and the duty to recover such posses-
sion.228 When the mother of one of two decedents in Bloom v. Bear229 re-
221. 705 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); 705 S.W.2d 408 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
222. Id. at 407. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 93 (Vernon 1980) provides, in part: "After a
will has been admitted to probate, any interested person may institute suit in the proper court
to contest the validity thereof, within two years after such will shall have been admitted to
probate, and not afterward .... "
223. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 83(b) (Vernon 1980).
224. Generally, a will may not be admitted to probate more than four years after the testa-
tor's death. Id. § 73(a).
225. 705 S.W.2d at 410.
226. Id.; see also Estate of Morris, 577 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
227. 705 S.W.2d at 410. Consistent with the decision upholding the 1981 will, the court in
a third companion case held that an action seeking to set aside an unrecorded deed to named
individuals, executed by the decedent, was rendered moot by the fact that the same individuals
received the property in question under the 1981 will. Klein v. Dimock, 705 S.W.2d 404, 405
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
228. This right of possession exists even if the estate has no debts, and regardless of
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fused to deliver the decedents' personal property to their respective
executors, claiming a lien on the property to secure payment of storage fees,
the executors sought to enforce their right to possession by court order.
Upon the probate judge's refusal to comply, the appellate court held that the
executors' right to possession was enforceable by court order and agreed to
compel the judge to sign such an order by the issuance of a writ of manda-
mus, if necessary. 23 0 In Price v. Estate of Schwartz23 1 charitable estate bene-
ficiaries sought the removal of the independent executor, the return of
$49,000 in attorney's fees paid to the executor by the estate, and damages for
the waste of monetary assets. Following the resignation of the executor, the
probate court reduced his fee to $6,339.12, but denied an award of damages.
Affirming, the appellate court agreed with the charitable beneficiaries that,
during the three years in which the executor served, he should have invested
estate cash totalling approximately $90,000 in some form of interest-bearing
account, but held that there was no definite limit on the amount of time and
circumstances under which cash may remain uninvested. 232 The benefi-
ciaries also sought and recovered their attorney's fees and costs. The court
in Roberts v. Schooler-Gordon Funeral Directors, Inc. 233 noted that an execu-
tor must pay reasonable funeral expenses from an estate based on the theory
that a member of a decedent's family may contractually bind the estate for
funeral expenses 234 or, absent a contract, such expenses are recognized for
payment under Probate Code section 322235 and given a Class 1 statutory
priority.
Temporary Administrators. The Texas Probate Code affords a judge broad
discretion in appointing a suitable person to serve as the temporary adminis-
tor of an estate.236 The court of appeals in Kay v. Sandier23 7 affirmed the
trial court's appointment of the primary beneficiary of a disputed will as the
whether an heir or devisee of the decedent possesses the assets. Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Fulfs, 417
S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). TEx. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 37 (Vernon Supp. 1987) specifically provides that the executor "shall have the right to
possession of the estate as it existed at the death of the testator . . . ; and he shall recover
possession of and hold such estate in trust to be disposed of in accordance with the law." See
also id. § 232 (Vernon 1980) (requiring personal representative to take possession of decedent's
"personal property, record books, title papers, and other business papers of the estate"); id.
§ 233 (requiring the personal representative to "use ordinary diligence to collect all claims and
debts due the estate and to recover possession of all property of the estate to which its owners
have claim or title").
229. 706 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
230. Id. at 148.
231. 711 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
232. Id. at 702. The executor testified that he intended to disburse the cash to the benefi-
ciaries when a neighbor found a purported codicil to the decedent's will. The codicil was in
dispute for the entire time during which the executor served.
233. 712 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ).
234. Id. at 647 (citing Goeth v. McCollum, 94 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1936, no writ)). If a contract exists, an interest charge for the extension of credit,
with statutory limitations, may be agreed to, but the 15% charge in Roberts was denied due to
lack of evidence at trial as to its reasonableness or propriety. 712 S.W.2d at 648.
235. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
236. Id. § 131(a) (Vernon 1980) provides that, in the event the decedent's estate requires
the immediate appointment of a personal representative, the county judge "shall, by written
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temporary administratrix, holding that the proponent of a will in a will con-
test is not, as a matter of law, disqualified from serving.238 Case law address-
ing whether a person is suitable under the Probate Code to serve as a
temporary representative has distinguished between a situation in which the
representative asserts a claim that is incompatible or adverse to the interest
of the estate, in which case he may be disqualified, 239 from a situation such
as Kay, in which the conflict is limited to a resolution of which of the parties,
including the administrator, will ultimately be awarded the estate assets. 24 °
The court rejected the contention that the beneficiary in Kay was unsuitable
because her position as temporary administratrix afforded her the opportu-
nity to use estate funds in the will contest. 24' The court reasoned that the
many restrictions placed upon the actions of an administrator under the Pro-
bate Code and the requirement of a bond would prevent this use of estate
funds. 242
The court of appeals again underscored a judge's broad discretion in ap-
pointing a suitable person to act as temporary administrator in Cravey v.
Hennings,243 in which the contestant in a will contest asserted that, as the
primary beneficiary under the will, she was entitled to preference in the se-
lection of the administrator. Probate Code section 77244 prioritizes the per-
sons qualified to receive letters testamentary or of administration, and,
absent a designated executor or surviving spouse, lists the principal devisee
or legatee in preferential order for the grant of letters. The court logically
pointed out, however, that this section is inapplicable to the appointment of
a temporary administrator because the ascertainment of the principal benefi-
ciary does not occur until the conclusion of the will contest, at which time a
temporary administrator would no longer be required.245 Thus, the only
requirement for the appointment of a temporary administrator is that the
party be suitable.246 Having chosen one of several qualified persons to serve,
order, appoint a suitable temporary representative, with such limited powers as the circum-
stances of the case require ...."
237. 704 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
238. Id. at 432; see also Mulry v. Grimes, 280 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1955, no writ) (appointment of testamentary trustee and executor named in contested will was
not an abuse of discretion).
239. 704 S.W.2d at 432; see Hitt v. Dumitrov, 598 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. Civ. Ap.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ); Haynes v. Clanton, 257 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1953, writ dism'd by agr.).
240. 704 S.W.2d at 432.
241. Id. at 433.
242. Id. A temporary administrator may exercise only the powers expressly granted in the
order making the appointment or in subsequent court orders. An expansion of powers may
require additional bond. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 133(a) (Vernon 1980). Further, the court
pointed out that no evidence existed that the administratrix had used any funds other than her
own. 704 S.W.2d at 433.
243. 705 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
244. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 77 (Vernon 1980).
245. 705 S.W.2d at 370. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 132(a) (Vernon 1980) provides for the
appointment of a temporary administrator during the pendency of a contest concerning the
probate of a will or the grant of letters of administration.
246. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 131(a) (Vernon 1980).
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the judge had not abused his discretion in failing to appoint the appellant. 247
Claims. The court in Donaldson v. Taylor 248 classified appellee's claim alleg-
ing breach of warranties and breach of contract in the repair of the structure
of her home as an unliquidated claim rather than as a claim for money, and
recognized that the appellee was not required to present the claim against
the estate of the original contractor within six months from the grant of
letters of administration. 249 The court also upheld the individual judgment
against the decedent's son, the sole distributee of the estate, based on the
right of a creditor to sue a distributee in proportion to the amount of the
estate the distributee has received. 250
V. GUARDIANSHIPS
Having had the bank appointed as guardian of her son's estate, the appel-
lant in Moore v. First City Bank 25 1 later unsuccessfully sought the bank's
removal. The issue she presented on appeal was whether the bank was enti-
tled to the award of attorney's fees granted by the probate court under Pro-
bate Code section 242.252 That section provides, in part: "Personal
representatives of estates shall also be entitled to all necessary and reason-
able expenses incurred by them in the preservation, safe-keeping, and man-
agement of the estate, . . . and all reasonable attorney's fees, necessarily
incurred in connection with the proceedings and management of such estate,
on satisfactory proof to the court. ' 253 Affirming the probate court, the court
disagreed with the contention that the suit did not involve the preservation,
safe-keeping, or management of the estate.254 The court held that a guard-
ian should not be required to bear its own costs in an ill-founded removal
action, particularly in light of testimony showing the professional manner in
which the bank had served the ward's interests. 255 In Hart v. Hart 256 the
court upheld the trial court judgment that a guardian or next friend does not
have standing to maintain a divorce action on behalf of a mentally incompe-
tent ward. 257
247. 705 S.W.2d at 371.
248. 713 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
249. Id. at 718; see also TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 298(a) (Vernon 1980) (claims for money
against estate postponed if not presented within six months from grant of letters of
administration).
250. 713 S.W.2d at 718; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 269 (Vernon 1980).
251. 707 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
252. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 242 (Vernon 1980).
253. Id.
254. 707 S.W.2d at 287.
255. Id. The court explained that to hold otherwise might well have a chilling effect on the
willingness of others to serve in a fiduciary capacity. Id.
256. 705 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
257. Id. at 332. The court noted, however, that few Texas cases have addressed this issue,
but that the holding is consistent with the majority of states and with the one Texas opinion
most clearly on point. Id. at 332-33; see also Dillion v. Dillion, 274 S.W. 217, 220 (Tex. Civ.




Constructive Trusts. In two recent cases involving constructive trusts, Texas
courts have had to address federal statutes in reaching their decisions. In
Towne v. Towne 258 the decedent agreed that his first wife would own his
Veterans Administration Life Insurance policy as a part of their property
division upon divorce. Unknown to his first wife, or to the court, two
months prior to entering into the property settlement agreement approved
by the court the decedent had designated his future wife as beneficiary of the
policy, the proceeds of which were subsequently paid to her upon his death.
Despite the fact that legal title to the proceeds had clearly vested in his sec-
ond wife, the trial court determined that the decedent had committed fraud,
and it imposed a constructive trust upon the proceeds in favor of the first
wife. On appeal, the second wife argued that the constructive trust and the
property settlement agreement restricting the decedent's right to change ben-
eficiaries violated a federal statute protecting the decedent's absolute right to
alter beneficiary designations at any time.259 The appellant relied upon the
decision in Ridgway v. Ridgway,260 in which the United States Supreme
Court refused to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of a policy
issued to a serviceman under the Serviceman's Group Life Insurance Act of
1965.261 The serviceman in Ridgway had similarly failed to honor his di-
vorce agreement by altering his beneficiary, yet the Court reasoned262 that
the constructive trust was inconsistent with the federal statute's language
that payments should "not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure, by or
under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt
by the beneficiary. ' 263 In its Ridgway decision the Court was careful to dis-
tinguish a situation in which a decedent wrongfully divests his wife of an
interest in her own property, citing with approval its prior Yiatchos v.
Yiatchos 264 decision in which the court described the doctrine of fraud as an
"exception to the regulatory imperative. ' 265 The court in Towne found that
the decedent had likewise attempted to divest his first wife of an interest in
her own property, and explained that had she known of his change in the
beneficiary designation, she could have demanded to receive other property
258. 707 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
259. See 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1982).
260. 454 U.S. 46, 60 (1981).
261. 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1982). The trial court in Ridgway had also refused to impose a
constructive trust, reasoning that to do so would interfere with the federal act, and would be
impermissible under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. See 707 S.W.2d
at 747.
262. 454 U.S. at 60.
263. 38 U.S.C. § 770 (1982). Although the statutes in Towne and Ridgway differ, their
operative language is the same.
264. 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
265. Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 58 (citing Yiatchos, 376 U.S. at 307). In Yiatchos the decedent
purchased government savings bonds with community funds, payable at death to his brother.
Refusing to allow the bonds to be used as a vehicle to deprive the wife of her community
property rights, the Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the decedent had
"committed fraud or breach of trust tantamount to fraud." 376 U.S. at 309.
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incident to their divorce. 266 In affirming the imposition of a constructive
trust on the insurance proceeds, the court refused to elevate the federal inter-
est in permitting a soldier to designate his own beneficiary over the commis-
sion of fraud. 267
The court in In re Lodek 268 faced the issue of whether a constructive trust
imposed on a debtor's homestead was an equitable lien avoidable under the
Bankruptcy Code as a judicial lien. 269 Holding that the lien was not a judi-
cial lien that would be avoidable, the court distinguished an equitable lien
arising out of a constructive trust as an interest in a specific piece of property
created under Texas law at the time the property was wrongfully taken. 270
The creditor's interest in that property therefore precedes the judicial pro-
ceedings formally declaring the equitable lien and does not constitute a judi-
cial lien under the terms of the Bankruptcy Code.27 1
The statute of frauds did not bar the imposition of a constructive trust in
Hamblet v. Coveney,272 in which the appellee, who was having difficulty with
her mortgage payments, agreed to sell her home to her niece and her niece's
husband for a given sum, to be paid mostly in cash, with a promissory note
for the difference. Because of appellants' difficulty in obtaining financing,
the appellee further agreed to sign a contract and closing documents listing
only the cash amount as the total purchase price. After the appellants failed
to execute the promissory note, they asserted the statute of frauds 27 3 as a
defense to the appellee's suit to impose a constructive trust. The court, how-
ever, held that "a constructive trust based on a prior confidential relation-
ship and unfair conduct or unjust enrichment is an exception to this rule."'274
The fact that the appellee had knowingly made false statements to the lend-
ing institution was held to be an inadequate defense by the appellants in light
of their own comparable conduct. 275 The court had little difficulty finding
the requisite prior confidential relationship based on the appellee's close rela-
tionship with her niece and her trust and reliance on her niece's husband
over the years, 276 as well as the element of unjust enrichment or unfair con-
duct on the part of appellants. 277 The court affirmed the imposition of a
266. 707 S.W.2d at 748-49.
267. Id. at 749.
268. 61 Bankr. 66 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986).
269. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982).
270. 61 Bankr. at 68. A constructive trust arises at the time legal title to property wrong-
fully acquired passes. See Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 133 (Tex. 1974).
271. 61 Bankr. at 68.
272. 714 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
273. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
274. 714 S.W.2d at 130; accord Ginther v. Taub, 675 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. 1984); Rankin
v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. 1977).
275. 714 S.W.2d at 130. As pointed out by the appellants, it is against federal law to falsify
loan documents for the purpose of influencing a federal savings and loan association, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1982). Aside from the jury's questionable finding that the appellee's
knowingly false statements were not made to influence the lender, the court refused to allow
the appellants to enrich themselves unjustly as a result of wrongful conduct they not only
engaged in, but also initiated. 714 S.W.2d at 130.
276. 714 S.W.2d at 129.
277. The court upheld the jury's finding of constructive fraud. Id. at 132.
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constructive trust on the real property owned by both appellants, despite the
fact that the jury found no wrongdoing on the part of the appellee's niece,
because the niece had been unjustly enriched by the fraudulent conduct of
her husband. 278 The court enforced the constructive trust by impressing a
second lien on the real property, a manner of enforcement permitted in eq-
uity, rather than causing a division of the property in kind. 2
79
A party seeking the equitable remedy of a constructive trust must himself
be willing to do equity.280 The appellee in Velchoff v. Campbell 281 sought
the imposition of a constructive trust on oil and gas leases he alleged his
broker obtained through knowledge learned in the course of their fiduciary
relationship. The court required the appellee to have paid the broker his
compensation for services. In a decision turning on a point of procedure, the
court held that appellee had satisfied this requirement through requests for
admissions that were deemed admitted due to untimely filed responses.
28 2
The court therefore affirmed summary judgment granting the constructive
trust.283
In Ford v. Long 28 4 and Thompson v. Mayes28 5 the courts employed con-
structive trusts to prevent individuals from benefiting from their unlawful
acts of murder. The victim in Ford v. Long, the appellant's wife, had left her
estate to her sister. When her sister, the appellee, sued for partition of the
decedent's real property, including her home and furniture, the appellant
asserted his homestead right in the property and his right to use the furni-
ture as exempt property. Affirming the imposition of a constructive trust,
the court cited the long-standing rule that, in equity, a person may not be
allowed to benefit from his own wrong.286 The constructive trust did not
violate the Texas Constitution by depriving the appellant of property law-
fully acquired, but merely precluded him from enjoying property taken as
the survivor of the community. 28 7
The facts in Thompson v. Mayes28 8 were far more unusual. A constructive
trust was imposed on the interest of a devisee under his father's will based on
the jury finding that the devisee had intentionally murdered his father,
although the devisee had never been indicted for the murder and the evi-
278. Id. at 130-31. The Texas Supreme Court has held that the interest of a knowing or
unknowing beneficiary of fraud, whether or not he has personally committed the fraud, may be
impressed with a constructive trust. See Ginther v. Taub, 675 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. 1984).
279. 714 S.W.2d at 132; accord Bush v. Gaffney, 84 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1935, no writ).
280. Hull v. Fitz-Gerald, 232 S.W.2d 93, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950), aff'd, 150
Tex. 39, 56, 237 S.W.2d 256, 265 (1951).
281. 710 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
282. Id. at 615; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
283. 710 S.W.2d at 615.
284. 713 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
285. 707 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
286. 713 S.W.2d at 799; see also Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 24, 211 S.W.2d 559, 560
(1948).
287. 713 S.W.2d at 799. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 21 provides that "No conviction shall work
corruption of blood, or forfeiture of estate .... " Appellant had contended that the use of a
constructive trust was constitutionally impermissible.
288. 707 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
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dence against him was circumstantial. The appellant 289 asserted the same
constitutional defense as had the appellant in Ford, and was equally unsuc-
cessful. 290 The court also rejected a limitations defense, noting that a suit in
equity to prevent unjust enrichment was not governed by the two-year stat-
ute of limitations applicable to actions for injury done to the person of an-
other.29 1 The appellee and appellant, the decedent's only children, had
signed an "Agreement as to Finality of Judgment" in a prior suit to probate
their father's will, waiving the right to appeal that suit and agreeing that the
judgment probating the will was final. This agreement, however, did not bar
a subsequent suit seeking the creation of a constructive trust, and the filing
of the second suit did not cause the appellee to have unclean hands, which
would deny a recovery in a court of equity. 292 Res judicata did not bar the
later suit since the suit to probate the decedent's will involved a different
subject matter, theory of recovery, operative facts, and measure of recovery
than the action to impose a constructive trust.29 3 The court explained that
the initial suit addressed the authenticity of the will and proof of the testa-
tor's death, while the later action focused on whether appellant had wrong-
fully and intentionally taken his father's life.294
Spendthrift Trusts. An exception to the spendthrift trust rule, a claim for the
support of the beneficiary's children, was recognized in First City National
Bank v. Phelan.295 Consistent with the Texas Family Code, 296 an amended
divorce decree ordered the trustees of a testamentary spendthrift trust, of
which the appellant was an income beneficiary, to pay income directly to the
appellant for the support of his minor children. Several years later, the ap-
pellee obtained a judgment against the appellant for the unsatisfied portion
of his child support obligations. The court in First City affirmed the trial
court order that the total outstanding child support payments be satisfied
289. The appellant, a devisee under his father's will, committed suicide subsequent to the
filing of the action seeking the imposition of a constructive trust. His mother, individually and
as the executrix under her son's will, was substituted as the defendant and served as the appel-
lant hereunder.
290. 707 S.W.2d at 955; see TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 21; see also TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 41(d) (Vernon 1980).
291. 707 S.W.2d at 954; see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (repealed 1985)
(now codified at TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003 (Vernon 1986)) (two-year statute of
limitation for actions based on injuries resulting in death).
292. 707 S.W.2d at 954. By filing the second suit, the appellee had not challenged the
judgment probating her father's will. Id.
293. Id. at 955. Note that district courts have jurisdiction over suits applying constructive
trusts. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
294. 707 S.W.2d at 955.
295. 718 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also A.
ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 157.1 (1939).
296. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(c) (Vernon 1975) provides:
The court may order the trustees of a spendthrift or other trust to make dis-
bursements for the support of the child to the extent the trustees are required to
make payments to a beneficiary who is required to make support payments
under this section. If disbursement of the assets of the trust is discretionary in
the trustees, the court may order payments for the benefit of the child from the
income of the trust, but not from the principal.
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from the trust net income due to the appellant, even if the effective collection
of that sum took place after the youngest child had attained age eighteen.
297
Charitable Trusts. The attorney general in Blocker v. State 298 sought to nul-
lify the distribution of certain real property from a charitable corporation,
upon dissolution, to the estate of one of its founders. Three of the four direc-
tors who had authorized this distribution were beneficiaries under the de-
ceased founder's will. The appellants asserted that their actions were in
compliance with the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act,299 which provides
that upon dissolution the assets were to be applied first to satisfy liabilities
and obligations of the corporation, then returned or transferred in accord-
ance with the requirements of conditional donations, if any, then, to the ex-
tent assets were donated only for charitable purposes, distributed to similar
charitable corporations, and finally, absent provisions in the articles and by-
laws addressing distributive rights of members, distributed to any persons or
organizations, charitable or otherwise, pursuant to an adopted plan of distri-
bution.3° With no express requirement limiting the donation of the real
property to charitable purposes only, and no condition of return, the appel-
lants contended that they were free to select any recipient of the property
upon dissolution. The trial court disagreed, however, and held that the dis-
tribution by the directors, essentially to themselves, constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty, to be remedied by the imposition of a constructive trust and
by forming a new charitable organization with similar purposes, through the
application of the cy pres doctrine.301 In a case of first impression, the appel-
late court examined whether a charitable gift with no express limitation on
use will be deemed to have been made for the charitable purposes of the
donee.302 If so, the distribution upon dissolution of the donee organization
must be made in compliance with the section requiring a conveyance to an
organization similar in purpose. Th& court cited with approval California 30 3
and Nebraska 3°4 Supreme Court decisions agreeing with this viewpoint, as
297. 718 S.W.2d at 406. The court relied on the Texas "turnover statutes," designed to
permit a judgment creditor to reach the property of a judgment debtor when such property
interests include the future right to receive money, which cannot be readily attached or levied
upon. Id. at 405; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3827a (repealed 1985) (now codified at
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002 (Vernon 1986)).
298. 718 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
299. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-6.02A (Vernon 1980).
300. Id. An amendment to the Act effective September 1, 1985, and applicable to corpora-
tions formed after that date, requires that the assets remaining upon dissolution, after payment
of debts and the return of conditionally held property, are to be distributed only to tax-exempt
organizations pursuant to a plan of distribution adopted as provided in the Act, unless the
articles of incorporation provide otherwise. Court distributions are to be made in a manner
that will best accomplish the general purposes for which the corporation was formed. Id. art.
1396-6.02A (Vernon Supp. 1987).
301. 718 S.W.2d at 412. The appellate court defined cypres as the court's equitable power
to carry out a testator's general charitable purpose when the effectuation of his particular
intent is impossible, impractical, or illegal. Id. at 411 n.l.
302., Id. at 413.
303. In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Soc'y, 40 Cal. 2d 852, 257 P.2d 1, 6, cert. denied,
346 U.S. 888 (1953).
304. In re Harrington's Estate, 151 Neb. 81, 36 N.W.2d 577, 582 (1949).
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well as a Texas Supreme Court opinion on another issue, stating that a gift to
a charitable organization is presumed to be a charitable gift to be held in
trust for that organization's charitable purposes, regardless of whether the
donor stated a purpose for the initial gift.30 5 The appellate court conse-
quently concluded that:
[P]roperty transferred unconditionally to a non-profit corporation,
whose purpose is established as or determined to be a public charity or
an educational facility, is nevertheless subject to implicit charitable or
educational limitations defined by the donee's organizational purpose
and within the meaning of the statute, where no express limitation to
the contrary is stated in the transfer; i.e., the transferred property is
deemed a gift to the charitable purposes and objects of the corporation.
No technical words or further manifestations of general charitable in-
tent are necessary in order to create such a trust. 30 6
Accordingly, the court held that the directors had breached their fiduciary
and statutory duty to distribute assets remaining upon dissolution to charita-
ble organizations similar in purpose and affirmed the trial court imposition
of a constructive trust and application of the cy pres doctrine to transfer the
assets to a new, but similar, organization. 307
The charitable foundation in Gregory v. MBank Corpus Christi, N.A.,308
required to make annual distributions under the Internal Revenue Code, an-
nounced grants to multiple charitable organizations to be made in trust
pending the disposition of federal court litigation filed by the appellant. Due
to unexpected delays of over five years in the federal litigation, the dismissal
of which was being appealed, the foundation and the bank as its trustee peti-
tioned the trial court to permit modification of the trusts in order to facilitate
distributions to the designated charitable beneficiaries. 30 9 The appellant
challenged the trial court decision to make the trusts revocable on the
grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and erred in denying his in-
tervention as a necessary and indispensable party. The appellate court con-
curred that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the suit to modify the
trust as a declaratory judgment action because there was no justiciable con-
troversy among the parties, but pointed out that proceedings to modify a
trust as provided under the Texas Trust Code do not require a justiciable
controversy. 310 The appellate court also observed that the appellant's pres-
305. Boyd v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 145 Tex. 206, 220, 196 S.W.2d 497, 505 (1946).
306. 718 S.W.2d at 415 (emphasis in original).
307. Id. at 416. The use of a constructive public charitable trust is an accepted remedy for
the breach of a fiduciary relationship. See Slay v. Bennett Trust, 143 Tex. 621, 640, 187
S.W.2d 377, 388 (1945); Horton v. Harris, 610 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Harvey v. Casebeer, 531 S.W.2d 206, 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no
writ).
308. 716 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
309. The Texas Trust Code permits a court to modify the terms of a trust upon the petition
of a trustee or beneficiary if the purposes of the trust have been fulfilled or have become impos-
sible or illegal to fulfill or if, due to circumstances the settlor did not know or anticipate,
"compliance with the terms of the trust would defeat or substantially impair the accomplish-
ment of the purposes of the trust." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1987).
310. 716 S.W.2d at 666.
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ence was unnecessary in an action scrutinized by the court and in which the
attorney general appeared on behalf of the public and agreed to and joined in
the foundation's request.311
311. Id.
[Vol. 41
